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Abstract
The development of the silk industry in Renaissance Florence – as in other large Italian
cities such as Venice, Genoa, Bologna and Milan – was a response to the profound economic
changes wrought by the demographic crisis of the fourteenth century. The decrease in the
available labour supply, the rise in labour costs, changes in demand and consumption,
particularly among the upper classes, encouraged entrepreneurs in Florence and other urban
economies of Renaissance Italy to direct their manufacturing interests towards the production
of expensive high-quality goods. The Florentine silk industry was born in the last decades of
the fourteenth century, and in the ﬁfteenth century quickly developed into a dynamic industry
capable of producing large quantities of luxury fabrics for export to all the principal European
markets.
 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: Florence; Gold-beating; Guilds; Manufacturing; Plague; Silk; Textiles
When we talk about the ‘crisis of the fourteenth century’, we are generally
referring to a series of phenomena that have almost always been viewed as
negative, especially when attention has focused on the evolution of the European
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56 S. Tognetti / Journal of Medieval History 31 (2005) 55–69economy: recurrent plague epidemics, starting with the Black Death in 1348 and
the consequent sharp reduction in the urban and rural population, famine, war, the
abandonment of villages, the reduction or stagnation of agricultural yields, the
growth in wages and hence in the cost of labour, the inability of urban economies
to respond positively to changes in demand and consumption, and so on.
There are obviously innumerable variants on this sketchy outline of the ‘crisis’ in
the various European contexts. It is now clear, for example, that the economic
depression was experienced more deeply in Northern than in Mediterranean Europe,
that marginal areas suﬀered more from the drop in population and in agricultural
yields, and that, in general, the economic structure of the more important cities
managed to adapt to the drastic changes in the fourteenth century much better than
the small and medium-sized urban centres. In many cases the fourteenth century was
a period in which the gap in wealth between the various urban and regional
economies widened, a period in which a kind of hierarchy of production and thus an
early embryonic international division of labour was established.1
It is not accidental that the ‘crisis of the fourteenth century’ occurred in
communal Italy (the north and central regions of the Italian peninsula) in the context
of an increasingly simpliﬁed political situation. Through the political/military
subjection of a series of small and middle-sized urban centres, some of the larger
cities with republican regimes (e.g., Venice and Florence) or under dynastic rule
(e. g., Milan under the Visconti and Ferrara under the Este) or absolute monarchies
(Rome under the pope) began to expand on broad regional bases into large
territorial states. In this way the expanding states created the preconditions necessary
to achieve better-integrated economies of scale, even if corresponding more or less to
the needs and interests of the dominating city.2
An illuminating example of this is oﬀered by the serious diﬃculties faced in the
fourteenth century by the many Tuscan cities, such as Siena, Pisa, Arezzo, Pistoia,
Prato and San Gimignano, that had once been prosperous centres for trading,
banking and artisan activities. Florence, by contrast, not only responded in ﬁne
fashion to the crisis, but could also, thanks to its accumulated economic resources,
aﬀord to ﬁnance the growing costs of the wars it undertook to annex much of
Tuscany.3 This military conquest was accompanied by a series of economic policies
1 As regards Italy in particular, see the acts of the conference Italia 1350-1450: tra crisi, trasformazione e
sviluppo (Pistoia 1993), and also Michele Luzzati, ‘La dinamica secolare di un ‘‘modello italiano’’’, in:
Storia dell’economia italiana Einaudi, ed. Ruggiero Romano, 3 vols (Turin 1990-91), vol. 1, 5-114, esp.
63-105; Richard A. Goldthwaite,Wealth and the demand for art in Italy 1300-1600 (Baltimore and London
1993), 11-67; Reinhold C. Mueller, ‘Epidemie, crisi e rivolte’, in: Storia medievale (Rome 1998), 557-584;
Franco Franceschi, ‘La crisi del XIV secolo e l’Italia’, in: Una giornata con Ruggiero Romano, 25 ottobre
2000, ed. Leandro Perini and Manuel Plana (Florence 2001), 13-22.
2 For a general approach to this topic, see Stephan R. Epstein, ‘Town and country: economy and
institutions in late medieval Italy’, Economic History Review, 46 (1993), 453-477; Idem, ‘Regional fairs,
institutional innovation, and economic growth in late medieval Europe’, Economic History Review, 47
(1994), 459-482.
3 Between the middle of the Trecento and the ﬁrst quarter of the Quattrocento, Florence gained control
over about two-thirds of Tuscany: Prato and Pistoia in 1351, Volterra in 1361, San Miniato in 1370,
Arezzo in 1384, Pisa in 1406, Cortona in 1411 and Livorno in 1421.
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Florentine control. The wool and silk industries in particular – which were the most
important, the most lucrative, the most export-oriented and the most capable of
providing employment in broad sectors of the urban and suburban population –
were eﬀectively dismantled, or, in the best of cases, turned over to producing low-
quality fabrics that could not compete with the textile industries of the capital.
Certain niche sectors, on the other hand, were encouraged – shipbuilding and
leatherworking in Pisa, the production of cotton fabrics in Arezzo, iron-working in
the Pistoia area and papermaking at Colle Valdelsa.4
In the period when Tuscany (together with Italy and the rest of Europe) was
aﬀected by plague, famine and all the other factors we have already mentioned,
Florentine primacy over the whole region was an incontrovertible fact. In the early
fourteenth century, however, Tuscany was still prevalently polycentric, not only
economically but also from a political, artistic and cultural point of view.5
Florence therefore took advantage of the ‘crisis’, or rather of the incapacity of the
weaker and less ﬂexible economies of the other cities to respond eﬀectively to the
diﬃculties of the second half of the century, to increase the gap between it and its
rivals and ultimately to politically subject almost all of them. Naturally, all of this
could not have happened if Florence had not in turn taken steps to adapt its
economy to the rapid change in the situation and in international demand. One
of the more conspicuous manifestations of the ‘crisis’ was in fact the increase in
the cost of labour, an inevitable consequence of the drop in population and the
attendant decline in the labour supply. At the same time, there was a rise in the per
capita wealth of the aﬄuent classes, an eﬀect of the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a limited number of individuals. If we equal out the wage levels of
masons, manual building workers and farm labourers in the period 1326–1348 at
100, it can be noted that the wages in the period 1394–1430 were respectively 253,
4 For more on Florentine dominion in Tuscany and the basically negative consequences of Florence’s
economic policies in the subject cities, see Florentine Tuscany. Structures and practices of power, ed.
William J. Connel and Andrea Zorzi (Cambridge [England] 2000); David Herlihy, ‘Le relazioni
economiche di Firenze con le citta` soggette nel secolo XV’, in: Egemonia ﬁorentina ed autonomie locali nella
Toscana nord-occidentale del primo Rinascimento: vita, arte, cultura (Pistoia 1978), 79-109; Paolo
Malanima, ‘La formazione di una regione economica: la Toscana nei secoli XIII-XV’, Societa` e storia, 20
(1983), 229-269; Stephan R. Epstein, ‘Stato territoriale ed economia regionale nella Toscana del
Quattrocento’, in: La Toscana al tempo di Lorenzo il Magniﬁco. Politica economia cultura arte, 3 vols (Pisa
1996), vol. 3, 869-890; Franco Franceschi, ‘Istituzioni e attivita` economica a Firenze: considerazioni sul
governo del settore industriale (1350-1450)’, in: Istituzioni e societa` in Toscana nell’Eta` Moderna (Rome
1994), 76-117; Sergio Tognetti, ‘Attivita` industriali e commercio di manufatti nelle citta` toscane del tardo
Medioevo (1250 ca. – 1530 ca.)’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 159 (2001), 423-479, esp. 450-479.
5 See the acts of the conference La Toscana nel XIV secolo. Caratteri di una civilta` regionale, ed. Sergio
Gensini (Pisa 1988). On the more economic aspects, see also Malanima, ‘La formazione di una regione
economica’, 231-256; Tognetti, ‘Attivita` industriali’, 426-433.
58 S. Tognetti / Journal of Medieval History 31 (2005) 55–69299 and 307 (see Table 1).6 The available data for textile workers and artisans are
not, unfortunately, suﬃcient to provide similar statistics; however the wages of the
so-called ciompi (wool workers) cannot have been all that diﬀerent from what
building workers and farm labourers; likewise the most skilled wool artisans must
have earned similar wages to building masons.
The result of the increases in wage levels was a reduction in low-quality, labour-
intensive production and, conversely, the renewed vigour of activities relating to the
manufacturing of top-of-the-range goods where the high labour costs – inevitable if
one wanted to ﬁnd specialised, highly qualiﬁed labour – could easily be absorbed.
One aspect of the long-term conversion of the Florentine economy in the later
fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries was undoubtedly the expansion, in grand style, of
the silk manufacturing industry, which was directed towards producing ﬁne fabrics
to meet the growing demand for luxury goods on the European markets. Naturally,
the emergence of the silk industry was only the most glaring aspect of a phenomenon
that involved almost the whole sector of Florentine artisan manufacturing. Such
development would have been impossible if the bedrock structure of the Florentine
economy – international trade and banking, particularly the privileged sphere of
action of the so-called ‘banchi grossi’ or great merchant banking companies – had
not survived.
On the other hand, a similar development also took place in Italy in cities such as
Lucca, Genoa, Venice, Bologna and Milan – all centres possessing a hardened
squadron of merchant-entrepreneurs who were ready to adapt themselves to the
varying economic conditions and were capable of instantly seizing opportunities
Table 1
Index of some wages in Florence in the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth century
Masons Manual building workers Farm labourers
1326-1348 100 1326-1346 100 1326-1347 100
1350-1369 239 1350-1369 264 1350-1369 219
1371-1393 226 1371-1393 269 1371-1393 278
1394-1430 253 1394-1430 299 1394-1430 307
1431-1470 247 1431-1470 285 1434-1469 334
1471-1500 216 1473-1500 268 1471-1500 269
Source: Sergio Tognetti, ‘Prezzi e salari nella Firenze tardomedievale: un proﬁlo’, Archivio Storico Italiano,
153 (1995), 263-333, esp. 333.
6 Florentine wages are analysed in chronological spans of several decades in order to facilitate the
understanding of salary patterns over the long run. With this procedure one inevitably ends up levelling
out the highs and lows which are sometimes dramatic in the short term. For example, after the noted
increase in wages in the two decades following the plague of 1348, and before the next more moderate
trend towards higher wages in the decades around 1400, there was a modest decline in salaries in terms of
real buying power (as opposed to nominal terms) in the 1370s. Here we see a phenomenon that, although
almost negligible when analysing the price/salary dynamic in economic terms by decade, is nevertheless of
a certain social-historical importance given that it precedes and to some extent paves the way for the
so-called Ciompi Revolt of 1378. On this, see Charles Marie de La Roncie`re, Prix et salaires a` Florence au
XIVe sie`cle (1280-1380) (Rome 1982), esp. 771-790.
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modest scale in many other cities on the Italian peninsula, for example in the capitals
of seigniorial states such as Ferrara and Mantua, but also in Aragonese and Spanish
Naples. The overall eﬀect was that, during the Renaissance, Italy took on the aspect
of a luxury goods-producing zone within the larger panorama of the European
economy.7
Prior to the Black Death, the population of Florence may have been upwards of
100,000 inhabitants, while including the contado (the rural area under its jurisdiction)
it was over 400,000.8 Given such demographic density, the ideal activity from all
points of view was wool manufacturing. Throughout the pre-industrial age, wool-
working involved a large number of diﬀerent processes, some of which (for instance,
the preparation of ﬁbre for spinning) required a large, relatively unskilled workforce,
while the ﬁnal dyeing and ﬁnishing phases were handled by skilled workers.9 Some
processes were farmed out to rural workers. Spinning, for instance, was generally
carried out by women in country villages and suburban areas.10 The natural
consequence of all this was that labour costs comprised 60–65% of the overall cost of
production for the Florentine wool workshops, notwithstanding the fact that the
wool used in Florence was, generally speaking, high-quality (typically from England)
and expensive.11 It is clear, then, that it was essential to keep labour costs down.
Indeed this area of costs was the only one that could really be reduced, without, that
is, resorting to the use of low-quality wool; however, this would have compromised
competitiveness in the international marketplace.
The wool business also had the advantage of providing employment, directly or
indirectly, to a large number of people belonging to the working and lower-middle
classes, both in the city and in the rural villages adjoining the urban centre. In
Florence during the 1330s, nearly one third of the urban population, or
approximately 30,000 people, earned a living from the wool sector.12 In the decades
of peak population levels, all the Italian communal cities adopted economic policies
to encourage wool manufacturing. They had good reason to do so. In fact, it was the
7 For a thorough survey on the subject, see again Goldthwaite, Wealth and the demand.
8 For more on the population of Florence prior to the Black Death, already the subject of numerous
studies by Fiumi, de La Roncie`re, Herlihy and Pinto, see the article by William R. Day, Jr, ‘The
population of Florence before the Black Death: survey and synthesis’, Journal of Medieval History,
28 (2002), 93-129, esp. 94-111, which examines the status quaestionis and oﬀers a new and original
interpretation.
9 Federigo Melis, ‘Gli opiﬁci lanieri toscani dei secoli XIII-XVI’, in: Idem, Industria e commercio nella
Toscana medievale, ed. Bruno Dini (Florence 1987), 201-211; Paolo Malanima, La decadenza di
un’economia cittadina. L’industria di Firenze nei secoli XVI-XVIII (Bologna 1982), 202-214; Franco
Franceschi, Oltre il «Tumulto». I lavoratori ﬁorentini dell’Arte della Lana fra Tre e Quattrocento (Florence
1993), 33-38, 81-94.
10 Federigo Melis, ‘Sulla disseminazione dell’opiﬁcio laniero pratese nel Trecento’, in: Idem, Industria e
commercio, 308-316.
11 Federigo Melis, ‘La formazione dei costi nell’industria laniera alla ﬁne del Trecento’, in: Idem,
Industria e commercio, 212-307, esp. 293-294; Malanima, La decadenza, 214-217.
12 For a study of the establishment of the Florentine wool manufacturing industry in the Trecento, see
Hidetoshi Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze nel basso Medioevo. Il commercio della lana e il mercato dei
panni ﬁorentini nei secoli XIII-XV (Florence 1980), 65-152; Franceschi, Oltre il «Tumulto», 6-12.
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stimulating internal demand) and for maintaining public order by providing
employment for the potentially dangerous masses.13
The Black Death and successive waves of plague decimated the Florentine
population just as it did in other Italian and European cities. By the time of the
Ciompi Revolt in 1378, the urban population had fallen to about 55,000 inhabitants.
The ﬁgure obtained from the 1427 catasto was 37,000, a minimum ﬁgure that was to
rise only in the second half of the ﬁfteenth century. The same fate befell the contado,
where the number of inhabitants dropped from around 300,000 at the beginning of
the fourteenth century to 104,000 in the 1427 catasto.14 Given this prolonged drain
on the population, it was already a considerable achievement that the wool industry
managed to produce 9–10,000 pieces a year in the 1420s and 1430s, compared to
about 30,000 pieces in the early 1370s.15 During the same 50- to 60-year period,
in the face of a 30% drop in the city’s population, the overall labour force employed
in the wool sector, if compared with the urban trades taken together, fell by 60%.16
The strong growth in wages led to a beneﬁcial increase in consumption on the part of
the humble urban classes and had a beneﬁcial eﬀect on diet, particularly among the
poorer classes. This encouraged agricultural production in rural areas subject to
Florence and controlled by city-dwelling landlords. The rise in labour costs
nevertheless had negative eﬀects on the wool industry and drove many wool-
manufacturers to employ workers on a piecework rather than an hourly basis. This
was a response to the demands of a labour force that was much more expensive and
harder to ﬁnd than in the past, and also much less willing to accept the impositions
of employers.17
In such economic and demographic conditions, the best solution was to divert
capital towards high-quality production using top-quality raw materials, where
proﬁt margins would be suﬃcient to cover the higher labour costs and make it
possible to employ highly specialist craftsmen, as was the case in the silk industry.
Initial capital investment in the silk industry in the form of raw materials was
decisive. Indeed, although silk workers received considerably higher wages than their
counterparts in the wool industry, labour costs amounted to a far lower proportion
of overall production costs. The decisive factor in raising production costs was the
combined eﬀect of the price of silk and the highly prized dyes, which taken together
13 Raymond de Roover, ‘Labour conditions in Florence around 1400: theory, policy and reality’, in:
Florentine studies. Politics and society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (London 1968),
277-313, esp. 299; Philip Jones, ‘La storia economica. Dalla caduta dell’impero romano al secolo XIV’, in:
Storia d’Italia Einaudi, ed. Ruggiero Romano and Corrado Vivanti (Turin 1974), vol. 2, 1467-1810, esp.
1708, 1765.
14 David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans et leur familles. Une e´tude du catasto
ﬂorentin du 1427 (Paris 1978), 171-172; Giuliano Pinto, ‘Un quadro d’insieme’, in: Idem, Campagne e
paesaggi toscani del Medioevo (Florence 2002), 7-73, esp. 58-59.
15 Hoshino, L’Arte della lana, 199-200, 204-206; Franceschi, Oltre il «Tumulto», 13.
16 Franceschi, Oltre il «Tumulto», 100-104.
17 Bruno Dini, ‘I lavoratori dell’Arte della lana a Firenze nel XIV e XV secolo’, in: Artigiani e salariati. Il
mondo del lavoro nell’Italia dei secoli XII-XV (Pistoia 1981), 27-68, esp. 49-52; Franceschi, Oltre il
«Tumulto», 211-220, 328-330.
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therefore have been both pointless and damaging. Indeed, it was risky to lower the
wages of qualiﬁed workers, because they were the trade’s chief asset, and driving
them to search for better wages elsewhere could very well have favoured competition
from other cities.
The shift to high-quality production was nevertheless feasible only if there was at
hand an extensive and experienced class of internationally-minded businessmen,
accustomed to foreign competition and with expert knowledge of markets for
sourcing the raw materials and for selling the ﬁnished goods. Naturally this socio-
economic class also needed to be a fully ﬂedged part of the city’s governing class.
This came about in Florence from the second half of the thirteenth century onward.
In the early fourteenth century silk manufacturing in Florence was just one of the
many activities represented by the Arte di Por Santa Maria, the professional guild
that, together with those of the calimala (foreign cloth importers/exporters), lana
(wool guild), cambio (merchant bankers), medici e speziali (doctors and apothecar-
ies), giudici e notai (judges and notaries) and vaiai e pellicciai (furriers) made up the
seven Arti Maggiori of the city. Besides protecting the interests of the setaioli – silk
manufacturers and merchants – the Arte di Por Santa Maria also represented a host
of other artisans and tradesmen ranging from gold and silversmiths to the ritagliatori
(retailers of wool, linen and cotton cloth), tailors, haberdashers, armourers and
celonai (carpet and blanket traders), among others. No profession was regarded as
being particularly more important than the others, and the political weight of the
guild was due precisely to the fact that it brought together such a vast and
heterogeneous collection of modest entrepreneurial groups. The setaioli had neither
a numerical or institutional preponderance, and even their proﬁle as organisers of
the city’s silk manufacturing must have been fairly low-key.19
Things began to change in the second half of the fourteenth century, when the
general economic and demographic factors we have already touched on were
accompanied by an entirely contingent one – the emigration of entrepreneurs and
craftsmen from Lucca towards Genoa, Florence, Bologna and Venice.
It is generally agreed that market-oriented silk manufacturing in Italy (and
throughout Europe, with the exception of the territories of the Byzantine Empire)
originated in Lucca during the twelfth century. Here, for the ﬁrst time, silk
manufacturing had become a highly proﬁtable activity, managed by the city’s rich
merchant bankers, who exported their products to the major European markets.
Lucca maintained a kind of monopoly on production almost until the beginning of
18 Paola Massa Piergiovanni, Un’impresa serica genovese della prima meta` del Cinquecento (Milan 1974),
151-153, Eadem, ‘Tipologia tecnica e organizzazione economica della manodopera serica in alcune
esperienze italiane’, in: Eadem, Lineamenti di organizzazione economica in uno stato preindustriale. La
repubblica di Genova (Genoa 1995), 261-282, esp. 263-264; Bruno Dini, ‘L’industria serica in Italia. Secc.
XIII-XV’, in: Idem, Saggi su un’economia-mondo. Firenze e l’Italia fra mediterraneo ed Europa (secc.
XIII-XVI) (Pisa 1995), 51-85, esp. 74-75; Sergio Tognetti, Un’industria di lusso al servizo del grande
commercio. IL mercato dei drappi serici e della seta nella Firenze del Quattrocento (Florence 2002).
19 Florence Edler de Roover, L’arte della seta a Firenze nei secoli XIV e XV, ed. Sergio Tognetti
(Florence 1999), 6-7.
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ensuring that skilled craftsmen did not emigrate to other cities.20 In the second decade
of the fourteenth century, however, the violent political conﬂict between the Guelphs
and the Ghibellines undermined the productive equilibrium of Lucca. Factional
clashes, political persecution and condemnations to exile, ﬁrst under the Ghibilline
lordships of Uguccione della Faggiola (1314–1316) and Castruccio Castracani (1316–
1328) and then under Pisan domination (1342–1369), led to the migration of Guelph
silk traders and artisans towards the cities of the north and centre of Italy. These
exporters of capital and conveyors of know-how were welcomed with open arms and
were frequently given tax incentives and various other kinds of economic assistance.21
The most conspicuous example is Venice, where there was a marked acceleration in
silk manufacturing in the second half of the fourteenth century thanks to the steady
injection of entrepreneurs, capital and skilled labour from Lucca.22
In Florence this all happened more slowly. Emigrants from Lucca generally
preferred to move away from Tuscany, and Venice oﬀered more advantages than
other cities. It was the major Italian market for oriental goods, including Persian and
Chinese raw silk, and was well placed to sell silk cloth both in the Mediterranean
basin and in continental Europe. Furthermore, there was not, as in Florence,
a powerful and ﬂourishing wool industry.
It was not until the recession of the late fourteenth century that Florentine silk
manufacturing began to move towards a new phase of development. Statutory
reforms in 1404 and 1411 recognised the predominance of the goldsmiths and setaioli
grossi (the silk merchant entrepreneurs) in the Arte di Por Santa Maria, an
unequivocal sign that the guild was gradually being characterised as an industrial
corporation and a political manifestation of economic success.23 In 1420, in response
to pressure from the leading silk entrepreneurs, the guild began promoting gold-
beating, encouraging the immigration to Florence of skilled artisans from other
manufacturing centres.24 This made it possible to produce, in Florence, the gold and
silver gilt thread and leaf used to decorate and enrich silk cloth (above all brocade
fabrics) destined for a discerning clientele.
At the beginning of the ﬁfteenth century, silk manufacturing received attention
from the deliberative organs of the Florentine Republic, and the protection and
expansion of the new industry became one of the cornerstones of Florentine
economic policy. There were four main areas of intervention. They involved: (1)
encouraging the immigration of skilled labour, generally from Venice, Genoa and
Lucca; (2) impeding the reverse process in all possible ways, by oﬀering tax
20 Florence Edler de Roover, ‘Lucchese silks’, Ciba Review, 80 (1950), 2902-2930; Dini, ‘L’industria
serica’, 52-60; Patrizia Mainoni, ‘La seta in Italia fra XII e XIII secolo. Migrazioni artigiane e tipologie
seriche’, in: La seta in Italia dal Medioevo al Seicento. Dal baco al drappo, eds Luca Mola`, Reinhold C.
Mueller, Claudio Zanier (Venice 2000), 365-399, esp. 372-377.
21 Luca Mola`, La comunita` dei lucchesi a Venezia. Immigrazione e industria della seta nel tardo Medioevo
(Venice 1994), 24-36; Edler de Roover, L’arte della seta, 4-6.
22 Mola`, La comunita` dei lucchesi, 66-72, 197-207.
23 Edler de Roover, L’arte della seta, 9-11.
24 Bruno Dini, ‘Una manifattura di battiloro nel Quattrocento’, in: Idem, Saggi, 87-115, esp. 91-92.
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for anyone who emigrated to work in another city; (3) the elimination of all
competition within the Florentine state, eﬀectively prohibiting silk manufacturing in
the subject cities; and (4) the promotion of the cultivation of mulberry trees and
silkworm breeding in the Tuscan countryside so as to be less dependent on expensive
imported raw materials. Of these objectives only the last one was not fully achieved,
despite some modest and partial success.25 Silkworm breeding only really became
well established in Tuscany during the modern age at the time of the ﬁrst Medici
Grand Dukes.26
The catasti and city chronicles, company account books and records of
contributions made by the Arte di Por Santa Maria to the charitable bodies they
patronised (above all, the Spedale degli Innocenti) gives us quite a clear picture of the
general evolution of the Florentine silk industry in the ﬁfteenth century. The overall
picture is of marked growth, one might even say a boom, in the middle decades of
the century.
The number of workshops of the setaioli grossi rose from 33 in 1427 to 50 in 1461–
62 (see Table 2). The only small dip occurred in 1480, but for entirely exceptional
and contingent reasons that produced only short-term negative eﬀects.27 In addition,
there were the workshops of the setaioli minuti, which were a cross between an
artisan and a retail trader. They sold cuts of cloth and made ribbon, fringes, tassels,
belts, sleeves, silk bags and various other haberdashery items. In 1427 there were 18
such businesses, by 1472 the ﬁgure had risen to 24.28
25 Besides the works cited above in note 3, see also Luca Mola`, ‘Oltre i conﬁni della citta`. Artigiani e
imprenditori della seta ﬁorentini all’estero’, in: Arti ﬁorentine. La grande storia dell’artigianato, vol. 2: Il
Quattrocento, ed. Gloria Fossi and Franco Franceschi (Florence 1999), 85-107, esp. 99-105; Franco
Franceschi, ‘I forestieri e l’industria della seta ﬁorentina fra Medioevo e Rinascimento’, in: La seta in
Italia, 401-422. For a comparison with the economic policies of Genoa and Venice, see Paola Massa
Piergiovanni, L’arte genovese della seta nella normativa dei XV e XVI secolo (Genoa 1970), 183-198; Luca
Mola`, The silk industry of Renaissance Venice (Baltimore and London 2000), 29-51.
26 Judith C. Brown, Pescia nel Rinascimento. All’ombra di Firenze (Pescia 1987), 95-172; Hidetoshi
Hoshino, ‘La seta in Valdinievole nel basso Medioevo’, in: Idem, Industria tessile e commercio
internazionale nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo, ed. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Florence
2001), 165-176; Francesco Battistini, Gelsi, bozzoli e caldaie. L’industria della in Toscana tra citta`, borghi e
campagne (sec. XVI-XVIII) (Florence 1998), 49-69, 101-109. The silk industry was much more developed
in the dry-land areas of the Venetian countryside: see Mola`, The silk industry, 217-260; Edoardo Demo,
‘La produzione serica a Verona e Vicenza tra Quattro e Cinquecento’, in: La seta in Italia, 305-333; Idem,
L’‘‘anima della citta`’’. L’industria tessile a Verona e Vicenza (1400-1550) (Milan 2001), 47-57.
27 The short recession was mainly the combined eﬀect of the Pazzi Conspiracy in 1478 and the war that
broke out between the Florentine Republic and the Aragonese Kingdom of Naples, which was allied with
Pope Sixtus IV. In addition to this series of negative events, which closed two of the major outlets for
Florentine fabrics, there was a serious cereal crop famine and an outbreak of the plague in 1479, which
resulted in the temporary closure of the city’s workshops. For more on this, see Sergio Tognetti, Il banco
Cambini. Aﬀari e mercati di una compagnia mercantile-bancaria nella Firenze del XV secolo (Florence 1999),
303-307; Idem, ‘Problemi di vettovagliamento cittadino e misure di politica annonaria a Firenze nel XV
secolo (1431-1500)’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 157 (1999), 461-490, esp. 437-442. On the eﬀects of the crisis
on silk manufacturing, see Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, tables 1 and 2, 160 and 168.
28 Tognetti, ‘Un’industria di lusso’, 24-25, 27.
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1461 from 10 to 20.29 The overall value of annual production rose from 233,000
ﬂorins in 1436–37 to 270,000 in 1451–53, 300,000 in 1461–62 and 400,000 in 1490.30
At the same time there was a signiﬁcant increase in the number of gold-beating
workshops, rising from an average of 10.7 businesses in 1461–70 to an average of
18.2 in 1491–1500 (see Table 3). There was a sharp increase in the manufacturing
capacity of many companies, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and by the
end of the ﬁfteenth century there was much less need to oﬀer incentives to attract
skilled craftsmen from elsewhere. Trained gold-leaf craftsmen and weavers of
brocade and crimson velvet three widths of pile high were being turned out by the
city’s numerous artisan workshops.31
While in Boccaccio’s Florence the large ‘proletarianised’ workforce made a living
by working in the wool industry, the situation at the beginning of the sixteenth
century had changed signiﬁcantly. In a letter dated 9 April 1513, Niccolo` Machiavelli
pointed out to his friend Francesco Vettori: ‘As fortune has seen to it that I should
know nothing about the art of silk or wool manufacturing, nor of proﬁts or losses,
but that I am able to reason about the state, either I must shut up or devote myself to
reasoning about this’.32 It is interesting that ignorance of the basic, indispensable
workings of a society almost entirely devoted to business should make Machiavelli
feel at a disadvantage, but what seems to me to be most remarkable is that silk
should be mentioned ﬁrst in this short list of the city’s major entrepreneurial
activities. Wool manufacturing had certainly not disappeared, and indeed it was
undergoing a new phase of prosperity,33 but the city’s productive energies were now
Table 2
Number of ‘setaioli grossi’ workshops
Date Workshops Source
1427 33 Edler de Roover, L’arte della seta, 62
1451-1453 34 Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, 156a
1458 39 Dini, ‘L’industria serica’, 73
1461-1462 50 Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, 158
1472 49 Dei, La Cronica, 82, 126-127b
1480 44 Bianchi-Grossi, ‘Botteghe’, 61c
a Bruno Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria per l’arte della seta e l’economia ﬁorentina del
Quattrocento’, in: Gli Innocenti e Firenze nei secoli. Un ospedale, un archivio, una citta`, ed. Lucia Sandri
(Florence 1996), 153-178.
b Benedetto Dei, La Cronica. Dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500, ed. Roberto Barducci (Florence 1985).
c Maria Luisa Bianchi & Maria Letizia Grossi, ‘Botteghe, economia e spazio urbano’, in: Arti
ﬁorentine, 27-63.
29 Dini, ‘La ricchezza documentaria’, 163.
30 Ibidem, 166-168.
31 Dini, ‘I battilori ﬁorentini’, 158.
32 ‘‘Perche´ la fortuna ha fatto, che non sapendo ragionare ne´ dell’arte della seta, ne´ dell’arte della lana,
ne´ dei guadagni ne´ delle perdite, et mi conviene ragionare dello stato, et mi bisogna o botarmi di stare
cheto, o ragionare di questo’’, from Rudolf von Albertini, Firenze dalla Repubblica al Principato. Storia e
coscienza politica (Turin 1970), 45.
33 Hoshino, L’Arte della lana, chapter 5.
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including richly worked silk and gold-threaded silk cloth. The cost of labour had
increased, but so too had the skills and professionalism of the workforce. As a result,
Renaissance Florence never again achieved the demographic levels that the city had
reached in the early fourteenth century, given that the conditions for attracting the
immigration of a large number of unskilled labourers no longer existed. By the same
token, the social tensions that had culminated in the Ciompi Revolt in the second
half of the fourteenth century had also dissipated.
Success of such proportions would have been inconceivable if Florence’s
wealthiest citizens had not taken an active and determinant part in the development
of the silk industry in their city. They essentially contributed in three main ways.
Firstly, they transferred large amounts of their capital towards the setting up of new
silk enterprises, while in the past, if they had had to choose a safe and proﬁtable
manufacturing sector in which to invest part of their liquid assets, they had always
chosen the wool business. In 1438, the Medici family holding purchased a silk
workshop and invested 4,200 ﬂorins. Management of the business was entrusted to
two experts, who in turn invested a modest amount of capital, creating an initial
overall sum of 5,000 ﬂorins.34 Another notable example is that of Tommaso Spinelli.
After having been in the service of the large mercantile and ﬁnancial companies of
the Alberti family as a general assistant and administrator, he became a prestigious
merchant banker in his own right. In 1443–1447, Pope Eugenius IV nominated him
depositario generale of the Camera Apostolica, in other words the leading papal
banker. He was one of the major importers of Florentine cloth on the Roman market
in the 1450s and 60s, and set up a silk business in 1454 with 6,000 ﬂorins of capital.
When Tommaso died in 1471, moreover, the company was kept going by his heirs.35
Table 3
Number of gold-beating workshops in 1461-1500
1461 10 1471 14 1481 10 1491 16
1462 11 1472 17 1482 10 1492 17
1463 12 1473 14 1483 ? 1493 20
1464 15 1474 11 1484 12 1494 20
1465 10 1475 13 1485 13 1495 18
1466 9 1476 12 1486 14 1496 18
1467 9 1477 8 1487 16 1497 17
1468 9 1478 7 1488 18 1498 20
1469 8 1479 9 1489 19 1499 20
1470 14 1480 9 1490 18 1500 16
Source: Bruno Dini, ‘I battilori ﬁorentini nel Quattrocento’, in: Medioevo Mezzogiorno Mediterraneo.
Studi in onore di Mario Del Treppo, ed. Gabriella Rossetti & Giovanni Vitolo, 2 vols (Naples 2000), vol. 2,
139-161, esp. 145, 152, 154, 157.
34 Raymond de Roover, The rise and decline of the Medici Bank (1397-1494) (Cambridge [Mass.] 1963),
60-61.
35 Philip Jacks and William Caferro, The Spinelli of Florence. Fortunes of a Renaissance merchant family
(Pennsylvania 2001), chapters 2-4 by Caferro.
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commerce and international banking – Capponi, Corsini, Gondi, Mannelli, Martelli,
Pitti, Portinari, Ridolﬁ, Salviati, Serristori, Strozzi and so on – threw themselves into
the trade from the middle of the century onwards. They did not just invest in silk
workshops, but soon became involved in gold-beating as well, which enabled them to
cut production costs. The cloth manufacturing company no longer had to turn to the
marketplace in search of gold thread and leaf with which to decorate their cloth, but
simply used the sister company. The gold-beating workshop likewise drastically
reduced the cost of using intermediaries to provide purchasers for their output, given
that the majority of its business was conducted with the silk companies belonging to
the same entrepreneur.36
The example of the Serristori family is particularly emblematic, given that the
headquarters of the new silk manufacturing company set up in the middle of the
ﬁfteenth century was the same one used in the previous decades to run an important
and well-established merchant bank with a branch in Barcelona and numerous
correspondents in all the main Mediterranean and European cities.37 Besides its silk
manufacturing company, the Serristori also set up gold-beating workshops and
a host of related activities, including a series of limited partnerships operating in
Bruges and Lyons and, ﬁnally, a merchant company operating in London.38 The
considerable resources of the new Florentine setaioli and the extraordinary proﬁts to
be had in an industry that beneﬁted from constant injections of liquid assets can be
seen in the following straightforward data: between 1477 and 1491 the company
capital of the Serristori silk manufacturing company rose from 5,333 large ﬂorins to
24,248 large ﬂorins. The accumulated proﬁt between 1471 and 1492 amounted to the
astronomic sum of 57,688 large ﬂorins (see Table 4).
In the second place, while ﬁnancial capital represented a powerful impulse for the
development of Florentine silk manufacturing, a no less important role was played
by human capital. The merchant bankers, accustomed as they were to operating on
the international markets, had considerable knowledge of the centres for the supply
of raw materials and possible markets for the ﬁnished products. Wide ranging
commercial brokering had always been one of their main areas of activity. Thanks
to a well-established network of agencies and foreign correspondents they could
generally predict when a market was becoming saturated or vice versa, when the
prices of manufactured products, commodities and raw materials were going to
increase or decrease, or when interest rates were set to rise or fall. Joint ventures,
maone trust companies and a whole range of monopolist cartels frequently enabled
them to come up with the best prices. They were also highly expert in transferring
funds from one part of Europe to another by means of the bill of exchange. At the
international fairs of Geneva and then Lyons, which were fully ﬂedged international
36 Richard Goldthwaite, Private wealth in Renaissance Florence: a study of four families (Princeton 1968),
86-87, 161-162, 169-177, 214-216; Bruno Dini, ‘L’economia ﬁorentina dal 1450 al 1530’, in: Idem, Saggi,
187-214, esp. 195-197; Idem, ‘Una manifattura di battiloro’, 110-114; Idem, ‘I battilori ﬁorentini’, 145-158.
37 Sergio Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze. Ascesa economica e politica della famiglia Serristori (secoli
XIV-XVI) (Florence 2003), 77-89, 106-113; Idem, Un’industria di lusso, 49-64.
38 Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze, 124-139, 158-163; Idem, Un’industria di lusso, 64-84.
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held sway.39 It is no accident, then, that the Florentine silk traders channelled their
most upmarket products not only towards the major capitals and commercial centres
of the period but also towards the fairs of Geneva40 and Lyons41. In the space
of a few decades, mercantile and banking capital on the one hand, and expert
Table 4








Sales revenue from the





25.VII.1471 3331.06 10682.18.05 11941.00.11 1258.02.06
25.VII.1472 3229.05 9064.06.01 10782.10 1718.03.11
25.VII.1473 2847.11 7716.19.07 10010.11.06 2293.11.11
25.VII.1474 2900.07 7635.04.03 9169.01.05 1533.17.02
25.VII.1475 3497.01 9611.15.02 11037.09.08 1425.14.06
25.VII.1476 4575.10 12062.06.02 13629.16.03 1567.10.01
25.VII.1477 3877.10 12164.11.05 13823.11.04 1658.19.11
25.VII.1478 4777.02 13353.08.01 15187.18.11 1834.10.10
25.VII.1480 8257.10 22621.03.07 28689.04.06 6068.00.11
25.VII.1481 6474.01 15702.14.08 19335.07.01 3632.12.05
25.VII.1482 5866.06 14557.00.01 19016.07 4459.06.11
25.VII.1483 6249.02 16637.05.11 19849.04.02 3211.18.03
25.VII.1484 6357.07 15530.11.09 19127.18.08 3597.06.11
25.VII.1485 6739.04 15967.13.11 19218.10.07 3250.16.08
25.VII.1486 7146.07 17014.03 22023.19.11 5009.16.11
25.VII.1487 8059.05 19782.11 23390.04.05 3607.13.05
25.VII.1488 6743.03 17197.02.03 19933.17.01 2736.14.10
25.VII.1489 5499.08 14256.05.07 15346.14.10 1090.09.03
25.VII.1490 6493.05 13754.08.05 17701.13.10 3947.05.05
25.VII.1491 6439.02 15457.14.11 17128.08 1670.13.01
25.VII.1492 6172.02 16770.00.01 18885.07.02 2115.07.01
TOTAL 115535.06 297540.04.04 355228.17.03 57688.12.11
Source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Serristori, 595, fols. 6, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41,
42, 45, 46, 47, 55, 57, 58, 63.
39 Jean-Franc¸ois Bergier, Gene`ve et l’e´conomie europe´enne de la Renaissance (Paris 1963); Richard
Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe sie`cle. Lyon et ses marchands (environ de 1520 environ de
1580) (Paris 1971).
40 Florence Edler de Roover, ‘Andrea Banchi, Florentine silk manufacturer and merchant in the
ﬁfteenth century’, in: Studies in medieval and renaissance history, ed. William M. Bowsky (Lincoln,
Nebraska 1966), vol. III, 221-285, esp. 264, 266-268; Michele Cassandro, Il libro Giallo della compagnia
ﬁorentina di Antonio della Casa e Simone Guadagni, 1453-54 (Prato 1974), 60, 63-65, 67-71, 74-81, 90-93;
Idem, ‘Banca e commercio dei ﬁorentini a Ginevra nel secolo XV’, Rivista Storica Svizzera, 26 (1976),
567-611, esp. 593-598; Jacks and Caferro, ‘The Spinelli of Florence’, 88-90; Tognetti, Un’industria di lusso,
62-64.
41 Gascon, Grand commerce, 56-65; Dini, ‘L’economia ﬁorentina’, 193-199, 203-207; Tognetti,
Un’industria di lusso, 75-77, 88-91, 97-103 and passim.
68 S. Tognetti / Journal of Medieval History 31 (2005) 55–69management on the other had revolutionised the structure of Florentine silk
manufacturing. What in the past had been a skilled but quantitatively modest craft
trade with relatively little entrepreneurial ﬂair, had become a strategic sector of the
Florentine economy by the end of the ﬁfteenth century.
The third and ﬁnal factor is that the merchant bankers who engineered the boom
in the silk industry in the ﬁfteenth century belonged to the same social class that
managed and shaped the core features of the Florentine Republic’s economic policy.
I have already outlined the salient features of this, but I would simply like to add that
at the end of the 1430s and the beginning of the 1440s, in an attempt to block the
development of rival competition in Siena, the Arte di Por Santa Maria, with the
tacit support of the Florentine authorities, organised various plans to bribe Sienese
craftsmen to ﬂee to Florence after having set ﬁre to the looms. When this proved
only partially eﬀective, the Florentine corporation adopted the tactic of dumping,
swamping Siena with Florentine cloth at rock-bottom prices.42
Between the end of the ﬁfteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, the
Florentine silk industry was one of the most prosperous in Europe. Top-quality silk
and gold-decorated silk cloth were sold in large quantities in Naples, Rome,
Valencia, Lisbon, Lyons, Bruges, London, Antwerp, Nuremberg, Frankfurt,
Leipzig, Budapest, Constantinople, etc.43 At the beginning of the modern age, ﬁne
Florentine fabrics – on a par with those of Genoa, Venice, Milan, Bologna, Lucca
and so on – were one of the most important Italian export items. Thanks to foreign
sales of high-quality goods such as silk cloth, the trading balance of Renaissance
Italy was very healthy.44 All of this was the result of a progressive adaptation
to changes in international consumption and demand following the ‘crisis’ of the
fourteenth century. Focusing on the quality rather than the quantity of goods was
one of the objectives pursued and attained by the major urban economies on the
Italian peninsula. This model of development was only to decline with the depression
of the seventeenth century. This really was tragic for the destiny of the Italian
economy and society, both in terms of its intensity and the long-term negative eﬀects
that followed.
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